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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

ARTICLE 1 -

CPLR 103(c):

SHORT TITLE; APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS

Proceeding will not be dismissed because brought
in improper form.

CPLR 103(c) provides that once a court has jurisdiction over
the parties to a civil judicial proceeding, that proceeding shall not
be dismissed solely because it is brought in the improper form.
A recent illustration of the usefulness of this provision is provided
by Victor J. Georgetti, Inc. v. City of Long Beach.'
Petitioner, a government contractor, instituted an Article 78
proceeding seeking a judgment compelling the City Council of Long
Beach to enact a resolution for the payment of monies due him.
Without deciding whether a money judgment must be obtained
against the city before mandamus will lie, the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, held that the pleadings could be treated as a
demand for an interlocutory judgment against the city for the
amount owing, and, should the city council refuse to appropriate
the owed funds, petitioner could then apply, in this proceeding, for
a judgment in mandamus.
ARTICLE 2-

LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 205(a): Relief available when application for adjournment
on grounds of actual engagement is denied.
Under CPLR 20 5 (a), a plaintiff, who has timely commenced
an action that is subsequently terminated for reasons other than a
voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prosecute or a
final judgment on the merits, may commence a new action within
six months after the termination. Dismissals for failure to answer
a calendar call and failure to select a jury do not usually amount
to neglect to prosecute unless there is a pattern of dilatory tactics
or a contumacious refusal to proceed with the litigation. In
determining whether the dismissal is for neglect to prosecute, the
key factor is apparently
the intention of the trial judge who grants
2
the motion to dismiss..
In Cordova v. City of New York,' plaintiff's first action was
dismissed when an application for adjournment on the ground of
actual engagement was denied. Upon the commencement of a
'58 Misc. 2d 275, 295 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
See
27B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentary 45 (1966).
Schuman v. Hertz Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 604, 215 N.E.2d 683, 268 N.Y.S.2d 563
(1966) (mem.), rev'g 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't
1965).
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205.06 (1968).
357 Misc. 2d 823, 293 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1968).
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second action the defense contended that the prior dismissal constituted a dismissal for "neglect to prosecute" thus rendering the
six month saving period provided by CPLR 205 (a) unavailable.
In holding against this contention the court stated that the record
did not show, nor did the trial justice intend, the consequences of
a dismissal for neglect to prosecute.
When counsel has acted in good faith and has not willfully or
deliberately refused to go to trial, the potentially disastrous effect
of a dismissal after the statute of limitations has run will be alleviated by the provisions of 205(a).
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERVIcE, APPEARANCE AND

CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Husband's implied promise to pay for
necessaries is not a transaction of business.
In Inkelas v. InkelaS,4 an action for support and necessaries,
plantiff-wife attempted to secure personal jurisdiction over her
non-resident husband on the basis of an implied promise to pay for
necessaries. Plaintiff contended that, since she resided in New
York when the promise was made requiring her husband to perform here, the obligation constituted her an agent to make purchases on his behalf. Each purchase, it was argued, constituted a
transaction of business under CPLR 302(a) (1).
The Supreme Court, Bronx County, rejected plaintiff's argument and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Reasoning that plaintiff's husband had not committed any "purposeful act" 5 within New
York, the court distinguished those situations in which a separation
agreement is executed in New York.6
While the rationale of Inkelas appears to be sound, its result
is contrary to Venizelos v. Venizelos,7 recently decided by the
appellate division, second department. Unfortunately, however, the
court in Venizelas does not specifically identify the statute it is
invoking to supply jurisdictional basis. In view of the confusion
created, it would be helpful to watch for further developments in
the Venizelos case.
458 Misc. 2d 340, 295 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1968).

5The "purposeful act" criteria was first promulgated in Hanson v.
Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). It was applied to 302 in Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965) and re-applied in McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg
Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1967).
6 See, e.g., Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d
36 (2d Dep't 1967).
730 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1968).
See The
Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 498, 503
(1969).

